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Abstract
Policymakers often motivate their decisions by disclosing information. While this can
help hold the government to account, it may also give policymakers an incentive to "x
the evidence" around their preferred policy. This paper considers a model of biased
information gathering where the government can inuence the workings of an agency
in charge of collecting information. We examine how di¤erent disclosure rules and the
degree of independence of the government agency a¤ect citizen welfare. Our main result
is that insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information is always
unbiased, may not be socially optimal. A biased information gathering process can curb
the governments tendency to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus mitigating the
agency conict between policymakers and the public.
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Human experience teaches us that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may
well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interest to the detriment
of the decision-making process. (U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Nixon)
We also recognize that there is a real dilemma between giving the public an authoritative
account of the intelligence picture and protecting the objectivity of the JIC [Joint Intelligence
Committee] from the pressures imposed by providing information for public debate. (Butler
Report, p. 114)
1. Introduction
Transparency is an essential feature of a democratic and accountable state and yet, despite
substantial progress in recent years, exceptions to the principle of open government remain
commonplace (Prat, 2006). In the United States, for instance, the President has the right to
withhold information from Congress and the courts, typically on the grounds that he needs
candid and condential advice from his sta¤. Freedom of Information laws also frequently
allow policymakers to withhold information, most notably to protect internal decision making,
personal privacy and national security (Banisar, 2004; Roberts, 2006).
This paper examines one important rationale for lack of transparency in government: the
concern that public dissemination of information might compromise the quality of government
decision making. We develop a model where the government receives information from an
agency about a particular policy, and then decides whether or not the policy should be
implemented. For instance, the government might receive an intelligence report about the
opportunity to go to war, or an environmental impact assessment about the opportunity to
build a new nuclear power plant. As is standard in political agency models, the preferences of
the government and the public are not perfectly aligned. The government is more favorable
than the public towards implementation but also wants public support for its decision. Thus,
while policymakers may be more willing to wage war than voters, they are nevertheless
responsive to public opinion.
Our key assumption is that the agency may be politicized and hence its report to the
government may be biased. If the agency is independent, then it provides an unbiased report
about the consequences of implementing the policy, and hence about the appropriate course
of action. However, if the agency is not independent, then this report may be biased in favor
of the governments ex ante preferred decision; that is, the report may be biased in favor of
implementation. With a nonindependent agency, we assume that the government can choose
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the optimal degree of bias so as to maximize its own welfare. For instance, the government
may sta¤ the agency with individuals who are prone to stating a case for war, seek the advice
of biased experts, or encourage biased information gathering and evaluation. The drawback
is that all parties with access to the report (including the government) then receive lower
quality information which can result in poor decision making.1
We use this framework to address two questions, both from the perspective of the public.
First, should the contents of the report be publicly disclosed? And second, should the agency
be made independent of the government? Both issues are of great practical importance. It is
often claimed that secrecy is instrumental in protecting the integrity of the decision-making
process and indeed one of the most common exemptions to the principle of open government
concerns pre-decision information (Banisar, 2004). Granting independence to government
agencies is also becoming increasingly common. The Federal Trade Commission in the U.S.
and the Bank of England, for instance, have a status that ensures their independence from
political pressure by limiting the removal of their heads to certain specic causes. The British
commission in charge of investigating recent episodes of intelligence failure also recommended
to strengthen the independence of the Joint Intelligence Committee, although it fell well short
of recommending full independence from the executive (Butler Report, 2004, pp. 143-144).
In line with conventional wisdom, we nd that disclosure (transparency) makes the gov-
ernment more accountable and hence more responsive to public desires, relative to nondis-
closure (secrecy). However, disclosure also induces policymakers to distort the process of
information gathering and evaluation. In contrast, when no information can be disclosed,
the government has no incentive to manipulate information. Secrecy is therefore e¤ective at
protecting the integrity of the decision-making process.
1The recent debate on intelligence failures provides several examples of potentially biased information
gathering. Consider the case of Curve Ball. Curve Ball was the codename of an Iraqi informant whose reve-
lationsconstituted the backbone of the intelligence on Iraqs mobile biological weapons program during the
run-up to the second Iraqi war. These revelations, however, were later revealed to be complete fabrications.
The most disturbing aspect of the Curve Ball asco is that concerns about the reliability of this informant
appear to have been systematically suppressed. The Select Committee on Intelligence (2004), for instance,
reports that when the CIA agent who had interviewed Curve Ball raised concerns about his reliability, he
was told by the Deputy Chief of the CIAs Iraqi Task Force: "As I said last night, lets keep in mind the
fact that this wars going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didnt say, and that the Powers
That Be probably arent terribly interested in whether Curve Ball knows what hes talking about" (extract
from an e-mail provided to the Committee, p. 249). The WMD Commission (2005) also notes that "the
analysts who raised concerns about the need for reassessments were not rewarded for having done so but were
instead forced to leave WINPAC" (p. 193). It seems that, as a result of this biased vetting process, relevant
information was not transmitted to policymakers, thus potentially contributing to poor decision making.
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We also consider a constitutional stage in which both the disclosure rule and the agencys
degree of independence can be specied. The most surprising results emerge regarding what
rule and degree of independence maximize the publics welfare. We show that from the
publics perspective, secrecy is never optimal, but it can be optimal for the government
agency not to be independent. Secrecy is always dominated by transparency because its
chief advantage unbiased information can be more e¢ ciently obtained by insulating the
agency from political pressure. And yet the public may sometimes prefer that the agency
be politicized so that its report is potentially biased. For any given decision rule, biased
information increases the probability that the government will make the wrong decision,
which hurts the public. However, the government wants to avoid making the wrong decision,
so it taylors its optimal decision rule to the agencys level of bias. We show that a pro-
implementation bias in information has a moderating e¤ect; for given evidence, it makes
the government more reluctant to implement the policy. This moderating e¤ect benets the
public, which views implementation less favorably than the government. Thus, manipulation
of information can help mitigate the agency conict between the government and the public.
From a theoretical perspective, this result can be seen as an application of the theory of
the second-best. According to this theory, introducing a new ine¢ ciency manipulation of
information in an environment where another ine¢ ciency is already present the agency
conict between the government and the public can sometimes increase social welfare.
Previous work has examined how politicians can be held accountable when voters are not
perfectly informed. Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (2004) study models
where policymakers have private information and reelection concerns create incentives for
pandering. However, because these models do not allow policymakers to credibly communi-
cate their private information to voters, they cannot distinguish between transparency and
secrecy. Ashworth and Shotts (2010), building on Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), examine the
e¤ect of media bias. They nd that pandering incentives can be lower when the media some-
times refrain from criticizing the government because negative media reports then become
strongly indicative of an incorrect policy choice. Besley and Prat (2006) develop a model
where incumbents (good and bad) can manipulate media reports by o¤ering some form of
compensation to the media owners. Their analysis focuses on how features of the media
industry a¤ect the quality of the media reports and political turnover. In contrast, we focus
on how the integrity of the decision-making process can be protected when manipulation
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incentives are present.2
This paper is also related to the literature on transparency in principal-agent relationships
(e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Cremer, 1995; Stasavage 2004). Prat (2005), in particular, develops a
model of career concerns for experts where the principal can observe the agents action and/or
its consequences. He shows that transparency on action can induce the agent to disregard
useful private information and act in a conformist manner. As a consequence, the principal
can be better o¤by committing not to observe the action. Transparency on consequences, by
contrast, always benets the principal. Our focus is neither on transparency on action nor on
consequences. We measure transparency by the extent to which pre-decision information is
shared between the agent and the principal. Our focus is not whether transparency induces
conformism on the part of the agent, but whether an agent will distort his own information
(and possibly the principals) to inuence how the principal perceives his action.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
model. Sections 3 and 4 study di¤erent disclosure rules (transparency and secrecy), under
the assumption that the government agency is nonindependent. Section 5 considers the case
of an independent agency and compares di¤erent institutional arrangements from the publics
point of view. Extensions are discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes. Proofs are
gathered in two technical appendices.
2. Model
We consider a model of government decision making where (i) the government is responsive
to public opinion and (ii) the agency that provides the government with information is
potentially biased. The model has four stages. At stage 1, if the agency is nonindependent,
then the government chooses the agencys level of bias, q 2 [0; 1]. One can interpret q as the
type of bureaucrats who work at the agency. In contrast, if the agency is independent, its bias
is equal to zero (q  0). At stage 2, the agency produces a report for the government. This
report may or may not be publicly revealed, depending on the disclosure rule, as discussed
2See also Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997), Milbourn et al. (2001) and Suurmond et al. (2004). These papers
examine how reputational concerns a¤ect the incentives to gather information and implement policies.
3Levy (2007) and Swank et al. (2008) develop models closely related to Prats to study the e¤ect of
transparency on committee decision making. They show that secrecy can be conducive to better decision
making because, if individual votes cannot be observed, then voters have less of an incentive to distort their
actions in order to signal their types.
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below. At stage 3, the government makes a policy decision p 2 fa; ng, where a stands for
implementation and n for the status quo. The public then decides whether to support the
governments decision, v 2 fa; ng. For example, if p = a, we will say that the government
implements the policy, or that it selects implementation. If v = a, we will say that the
public supports implementation. At stage 4, payo¤s are realized.
Preferences. The payo¤s of the government and the public depend on the state of the
world, S 2 fA;Ng. For simplicity, we assume that A and N are a priori equally likely. The
public would like the policy decision to match the true state, a = A or n = N , in which case
its payo¤ is zero. The public incurs a loss of Ca if the policy is implemented and the true
state is N , and a loss of Cn if the policy is not implemented and the true state is A. Without
loss of generality, Ca + Cn = 1.
The public supports the policy decision that maximizes its expected payo¤. Let P denote
the publics posterior belief that the true state is A. The public supports implementation if
it o¤ers a higher expected payo¤ than the status quo,
 Ca (1  P )   CnP , P  Ca
Ca + Cn
= Ca: (2.1)
Thus, the public tends to support implementation if it believes state A is likely (P high)
and if the cost of mistaken implementation, Ca, is relatively small. For now, we arbitrarily
break ties in favor of implementation.
The preferences of the government are more complex. First, the government cares about
public welfare (a legacy concern). It incurs a loss of Ca from implementing the policy
when the state is N , and a loss of Cn from not implementing the policy when the state
is A. In addition to this legacy concern, the government enjoys a private benet B  0
from implementation. Finally, the government incurs a loss E  0 whenever its decision
is not supported by the public. This cost captures in a stylized fashion the disciplining
e¤ect of public opinion. One interpretation of E is in terms of electoral concerns: if the
government adopts an unpopular policy, citizens may vote for the opposition in the next
election. However, E could also measure other costs associated with a loss of popularity,
such as vilication by the press or reduced job opportunities in the private sector. The
notion of "public" should also be interpreted broadly. For instance, the model could apply
to settings where one country wants to convince others of a particular course of action to
receive logistic or military support. In that case E would measure the loss to that country
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should support be denied.
Let Gov denote the governments belief that S = A. Let 1fp;vg be an indicator function
that takes a value of 1 if and only if a particular policy decision p is not supported by the
public (p 6= v). Then the government chooses implementation over the status quo if
Gov  Ca  B + (1fa;vg   1fn;vg)E. (2.2)
Comparing (2.2) with (2.1), the government views implementation more favorably than the
public due to the private benet B, which creates a potential conict of interest. However, the
government can also be swayed by public opinion, as captured by the term (1fa;vg  1fn;vg)E.
For instance, the government is more likely to implement the policy if the public supports
implementation, in which case v = a and (1fa;vg   1fn;vg)E =  E.
Information Structure. Before making a policy decision, the government receives a report
from the agency. This report is composed of two signals, si 2 f;?g ; i = 1; 2. A  signal
provides evidence in support of implementation, while a? signal provides evidence in support
of the status quo. If the agency is independent, then these signals are genuine, sGi . Genuine
signals are informative, conditionally independent and satisfy Pr(sGi = jA) = Pr(sGi =
?jN) = , where  2 (1
2
; 1) measures the signal precision.4
If the agency is nonindependent, then the signal-generating process may be distorted.
Let sq = fsq1; sq2g be the report produced by a nonindependent agency with bias q 2 [0; 1].
We capture the idea of asymmetric vetting by assuming that with probability q, a genuine
? signal is transformed into a fake  signal. That is, the nonindependent agency garbles
the signal-generating process so that Pr(sqi =  j sGi = ?) = q, which is independent
across signals. The probability that a genuine  signal is transformed into a fake ? signal
is zero, Pr(sqi = ? j sGi = ) = 0. Thus q measures the agencys bias in favor of the
governments ex ante preference for implementation. A non-independent agency with zero
bias will behave just like an independent agency, and produce a report consisting of genuine
signals, s0 = sG =

sG1 ; s
G
2
	
.
If the agency is nonindependent, we allow the government to choose q to maximize its
own payo¤. This assumption is plausible if the government can appoint key agency person-
4We use two signals to allow for situations where the evidence is mixed. We use binary signals (instead
of a single signal with multiple signal realizations) because this allows for a simple parametrization of the
process of information manipulation (see below).
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nel or can punish or reward them.5 We also posit that the government only observes the
biased signals sq, rather than the genuine ones. This captures the fundamental drawback of
manipulations: information is lost which may have been useful for decision making.6
Before proceeding, we introduce some additional notation. Let (; )q be a shorthand for
sq = (; ). Any party that observes sq will update its beliefs about the true state, where we
dene
q+  Pr(Aj(; )q);
q  Pr(Aj(;?)q) = Pr(Aj(?; )q);
   q   Pr(Aj(?;?)q) = G :
These beliefs correspond to the three possible cases that can arise: (i) the report supports
implementation (sq = (; )), (ii) the report is mixed (sq = (;?) or (?; )) or (iii) the
report supports the status quo (sq = (?;?)). We sometimes refer to  signals as positive
signals, and to ? signals as negative signals. Note that   does not depend on q, because
negative signals must be genuine.7
We also make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Ca 2 (12 ; G+];
Assumption 2. B < Ca    .
Assumption 1 states that the public always supports the status quo when the evidence
is mixed, but would support implementation if it observed two positive, genuine signals.
Assumption 2 can be interpreted as a weak form of congruency between the government and
the public. It states that, even absent electoral concern (E = 0), the governments optimal
5Our analysis leaves the motivations of agency bureaucrats in the background, allowing us to focus on
how disclosure rules and public opinion can shape policy. For theoretical analyzes of bureaucratic behavior,
see for instance Prendergast (1993) or Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008).
6The assumption that the government only observes the biased signals sq implies that a government which
discloses forged information is not telling a lie. In this sense, disclosure is truthful. Also note that the public
does not explicitly penalize the government for manipulating information. This assumption could easily be
relaxed by assuming the government incurs an additional cost C (q) that is increasing in q.
7Simple computations yield q+ =
2+q2(1 )2+qR
V+2qR+q2V , 
q = (R=2)+q(1 )
2
R+qV and   =
(1 )2
V , where R 
2(1   ) and V  2 + (1   )2. It is easy to verify that rational agents discount the  signals more than
the ? signals because the  signals can be forged: q  12 = G and q+  G+. This e¤ect becomes stronger
as q grows: @q=@q < 0 and @q+=@q < 0.
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decision is state-dependent. This assumption is important because it ensures the government
bears a cost for manipulating information.
Together, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the government and the public always agree
when the evidence is clear cut. They both favor implementation when (; )G and they both
favor the status quo when (?;?)G. Nevertheless, disagreement can arise when the signals
are not genuine, or when genuine signals are mixed. In the latter case, the public supports
the status quo (by Assumption 1), but the government may prefer implementation (if B is
su¢ ciently large). This disagreement is the source of the agency problem in our setting.
Observability of the Agencys Bias. An important issue is whether the public can
observe the agencys bias q. For most of the paper, we will focus on the polar opposite
scenarios of transparencyand secrecy. Under transparency, both the agencys report and
its levels of bias are observable, while under secrecy, neither is observable. Transparency
should therefore be interpreted as an environment where information is easily accessible, not
just about the contents of the report, but also about the sta¢ ng, track record and likely bias
of the agency that drafts it. In contrast, under secrecy, information about the agency as well
as the report is tightly guarded.8 Intermediate cases between transparency and secrecy are
discussed in Section 6.
3. Transparency
We assume throughout this section that all information must be truthfully disclosed and that
the agency is nonindependent. Since the government and the public both observe the signals
sq and the agencys bias q, they will share the same posterior beliefs. Let (p(sq); v(sq)) denote
the governments payo¤ given sq, where p(sq) denotes the policy decision of the government
and v(sq) denotes the decision supported by the public. Let Pr(sqjsG) be the probability of
8The focus on the polar opposite scenarios of transparency and secrecy can be be justied on two ad-
ditional grounds. First, news coverage following the publication of the report may put the agency in the
public eye. Following disclosure, therefore, information about the likely bias of the agency may become
newsworthy/observable.
Second, publication of the report may allow the reliability and bias of the agencys sources to be assessed. A
concrete example is provided by the British Governments 2003 "dodgy dossier". This dossier claimed that it
drew "upon a number of sources, including intelligence material". Soon after its publication, however, it was
discovered by a Cambridge University lecturer to have plagiarized past academic articles to a large extent,
including the work of an American research student. Although ministers were exonerated from the charge
of having mislead parliament (Foreign A¤airs Committee, 2003), this dossier "undermined the credibility of
[the Governments] case for war" (Foreign A¤airs Committee, 2003, p. 42) and arguably cast doubt on the
competence and motivations of the civil servants in charge of drafting it.
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observing sq conditional on genuine signals sG. For any given q 2 [0; 1], the governments
expected payo¤ is
E(q) =
P
sG2f;?g2
hP
sq2f;?g2 (p(s
q); v(sq)jsG) Pr(sqjsG)
i
Pr
 
sG

: (3.1)
Equation (3.1) shows that manipulating information a¤ects the government through two
distinct channels. Higher levels of q undermine the governments ability to tailor its policy
decision p(sq) to the true state. This harms the government because its optimal decision is
state-dependent. However, changing the distribution of observed signals Pr(sqjsG) also allows
the government to shape public opinion, v(sq). This can benet the government by helping
convince the public to support implementation.
We begin with a preliminary result showing that the equilibrium level of bias is bounded
from above.
Lemma 1. The government will never choose a level of bias that leads the public to always
support the status quo. Formally, in equilibrium, q 2 [0; qmax], where qmax 2 [0; 1) solves
q
max
+ = Ca.
Because the public is rational, the weight it places on a positive report is decreasing in
the level of bias. When q > qmax, the bias is so large that the public disregards the report:
citizens support the status quo even when both signals are positive. The government strictly
prefers setting any q 2 [0; qmax], which provides better information for decision making and
can also generate support for implementation through a positive report.
Having restricted the set of qs that can be optimal, we now examine which policy decisions
are taken and supported in equilibrium. We begin with a partial result that simplies the
governments optimization problem. A full characterization of equilibrium play is provided
later in Proposition 1.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, the government selects implementation when both signals are pos-
itive and the status quo when both signals are negative. The public supports implementation
if and only if both signals are positive.
Lemma 2 easily follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 and the fact that in equilibrium q 
qmax. It shows that the public and the government always agree on the appropriate course
of action when the evidence is clear-cut (i.e., when the signals are both positive or both
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negative). What Lemma 2 does not show is whether the government will implement the
policy when the evidence is mixed, even though the public supports the status quo. To
distinguish between the two relevant cases, we make the following denition.
Denition (discipline). Fix q  qmax. The government is said to be disciplined by public
opinion if it selects implementation if and only if both signals are positive.
A government that is disciplined by public opinion selects the status quo when the evi-
dence is mixed, and so always enjoys public support.9 For given q  qmax, let E(qd) denote
the governments payo¤ under discipline. Specically, let E(qd) be a special case of (3.1)
where (i) q  qmax, (ii) the government selects implementation if and only if both signals are
positive, and (iii) the public supports implementation if and only if both signals are positive.
Note that E(qd) incorporates all the requirements in Lemmas 1 and 2 as well as the notion
of discipline.
A government that is not disciplined by public opinion will select implementation when
the evidence is mixed, despite a lack of public support. Let E(qnd) be the governments
payo¤ in that case. Thus, E(qnd) is a special case of (3.1), where (i) q  qmax, (ii) the
government selects implementation if and only if the signals are positive or mixed, and (iii)
the public supports implementation if and only if both signals are positive. Both E(qd) and
E(qnd) are explicitly computed in Appendix A.
To simplify the exposition of the results, we rule out corner solutions that would arise
when the constraint q  qmax is binding:
q  arg max
q2[0;1]
E(qd)  qmax: (3.2)
Like Assumption 2, condition (3:2) requires that B not to be too large. An explicit condition
is provided in the appendix (see the proof of Proposition 1).
We can now state this sections main result.
Proposition 1. In the equilibrium of the transparency game, the public supports implemen-
tation if and only if sq = (; ). Moreover
i. If B  Ca  12 , then the government selects implementation if and only if sq = (; ) ;
and the equilibrium level of bias is zero.
9This is true because q  qmax. If q > qmax, then the public would never support implementation.
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ii. If B 2 (Ca   12 ; Ca   12 + E), then the government selects implementation if and only
if sq = (; ) ; and the equilibrium level of bias is q = R
V
B Ca+1=2
Ca B    qmax, where
R  2 (1  ) and V  2 + (1  )2.
iii. If B  Ca  12 +E, then there are two possible cases. In the rst case, the government
selects implementation if and only if sq 6= (?;?); and the level of bias is zero. In
the second case, the government selects implementation if and only if sq = (; ),
and the level of bias is q = R
V
B Ca+1=2
Ca B    qmax. The rst case arises if and only if
E(q

d )  E(Gnd).
Proposition 1 fully characterizes equilibrium play in the transparency game. Case (i) deals
with a situation where B is so small that, regardless of electoral concerns, the government
would select the status quo when the evidence was mixed.10 The governments interests are
aligned with those of the public, so there is no need to manipulate information.
Case (ii) deals with a situation where the government would select implementation if
E = 0 and the genuine signals were mixed, (B > Ca  12), but where electoral concerns leave
it unwilling to make an unpopular decision (B < Ca   12 + E). Thus, there is a conict of
interest between the government and the public, but the government still selects the publics
preferred policy because of electoral concerns.
However, precisely because public opinion is so powerful, the government now has an
incentive to shape it. Note that the governments choice of q a¤ects the distribution of the
observed signals sq. This has two e¤ects on the governments payo¤ E(qd). On the one
hand, higher levels of bias q reduce the quality of information available for decision making.
Specically, with probability 1
2
q2V , two genuine negative signals are transformed into two
positive signals. This will result in the policy being implemented and in an expected loss for
the government of Ca   B    , relative to the counterfactual where q = 0.11 On the other
hand, the government wants to trickthe public into supporting implementation when the
genuine signals are mixed. Manipulations help the government because they can transform
mixed signals into two positive signals. This occurs with probability qR and yields a net
benet of B   Ca + 12 to the government, relative to the counterfactual where q = 0.12 The
10This follows from equation (2.2) and the fact that Gov  12 when the evidence is mixed.
11In fact, Pr((; )q j (?;?)G) Pr((?;?)G) = 12q2V and (w;w j (?;?)G)   (n; n j (?;?)G) =  [Ca  
B    ], where  [Ca  B    ] > 0 by Assumption 2.
12In fact, 2 Pr((; )q j (?; )G) Pr((?; )G) = qR and (w;w j (?; )G) (n; n j (?; )G) = B Ca + 12 .
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optimum q balances precisely these gains from manipulation against the costs associated with
poor decision making.13
The third case is when B  Ca   12 + E. This case is more complicated because the
government may or may not select implementation when the evidence is mixed. Condition
B  Ca   12 + E implies that in the absence of bias, q = 0, the government would select
implementation (no discipline). However, q is endogenous, and the governments optimal
level of bias may di¤er from zero. The crucial observation here is that for any given signal
realization sq, the governments incentive to select implementation is (weakly) decreasing in q.
As q becomes large, observed  signals are more likely to be fake, leaving the government more
reluctant to implement the policy. A large level of bias may therefore lead the government
to prefer the status quo when the evidence is mixed (discipline).
We distinguish between two cases, depending on whether the optimal q is above or below
a cuto¤ q^. The cuto¤ is dened so that, if q  q^, the government selects implementation after
observing a mixed report (no discipline).14 Thus, the government payo¤ on [0; q^] is E(qnd).
Conversely, if q  q^, then the government selects the status quo after observing a mixed
report (discipline). Thus, the government payo¤ on q 2 (q^; qmax] is E(qd).
Taken together, we obtain the following expression for the governments payo¤ as a func-
tion of q when B  Ca   12 + E:
E(qLB) 
8<:
E(qnd) if q 2 [0; q^]
E(qd) if q 2 (q^; qmax]
: (3.3)
Thus, when private benets B are large (LB), the government will maximize E(qLB) with
respect to q 2 [0; qmax]. Two types of equilibria can arise: one characterized by a low bias in
information and by no discipline (when the optimum q lies on the interval [0; q^]), and another
characterized by a large bias in information and by discipline (when the optimum q lies on
the interval (q^; qmax]). In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that the governments payo¤ is
convex over [0; q^] and concave over (q^; qmax]. It is because of this nonconcavity that, as stated
in Proposition 1(iii), the optimum level of the bias is either zero or q  arg maxq2[0;1] E(qd).
13Manipulations can also transform two negative signals into two mixed signals. Under discipline, however,
this change is inconsequential because the government always selects the status quo.
14Formally, q^ is dened as the minimum between 1 and the solution to q = Ca   B + E. See Appendix
B for an explicit characterization.
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3.1. Can the Public Benet from Biased Information?
Proposition 1 shows that, depending on parameter values, two di¤erent equilibrium outcomes
can arise: one with no discipline and no bias in information (q = 0), and another with disci-
pline and a positive bias in information (q = q). Moreover, under Case (iii), the government
may be willing to choose discipline precisely because it is also able to manipulate information.
If the bias were forced to be zero, so that the agency was independent, then the government
would become less cautious and select implementation when the evidence was mixed.
This subsection explores the idea that, due to the positive equilibrium association be-
tween bias and discipline, the governments ability to manipulate information may benet
the public. We begin with an illustrative example, describing the region of parameter space
(B;E) for which this is indeed the case.
The following gure shows the equilibrium level of discipline and bias implied by Propo-
sition 1, as a function of B and E, when Ca = 0:6 and  = 0:8.
EIPndG M = EIPdq
* M
B = Ca - 12 + E
EIUndG M = EIUdq
* M
B = Ca - 12
iii - No Discipline
No Bias
iii - Discipline
Bias
ii - Discipline
Bias
i - Discipline
No Bias
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
E
B
Figure 1: Equilibrium Level of Discipline and Bias, for Ca = 0:6 and  = 0:8
Figure 1 illustrates the regions of parameter space corresponding to the various cases of
Proposition 1. Below the horizontal line B = Ca   1=2, Case (i) implies the government will
be disciplined by public opinion and will choose zero bias. Above this horizontal line but
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below the 45 degree line B = Ca 1=2+E, Case (ii) implies the government will be disciplined
by public opinion, choose positive bias q, and would remain disciplined even if it were forced
to set a bias of zero. Above the 45 degree line are the two subregions corresponding to Case
(iii): one where the government chooses no discipline and no bias, and another where it
chooses discipline and positive bias q.15 It is in this latter subregion that the governments
ability to manipulate information may benet the public, which is the case in the shaded
area.
Whithin this latter subregion of Case (iii), the governments ability to manipulate infor-
mation has two e¤ects on citizen welfare. Bias makes positive signals less reliable, so that
the government selects the status quo when the evidence is mixed. This moderating e¤ect of
bias helps the public by making the government more cautious. However, bias also means
that seemingly positive signals may be forgeries, which hurts the public by unduly stacking
the deck in favour of implementation. The public will benet from the governments ability
to manipulate information if the gains from discipline generated by this moderating e¤ect
outweigh the losses due to biased decision making. Moreover, these losses are increasing in
the level of bias. Because q is increasing in B and independent of E, there is a threshold
value of B below which the public is willing to accept bias q to more closely align the
governments interests with its own.16 The public benets from the governments ability to
manipulate information in the shaded area of Figure 1, which is the part of subregion (iii -
Discipline and Bias) where q is su¢ ciently low.
More generally, as shown in Proposition 2 below, there is always a region of parameter
space (B;E) corresponding to the shaded area in Figure 1, where the public strictly benets
from the governments ability to manipulate information.
Proposition 2. For any Ca and  2 (12 ; 1), there are values of B and E such that a
commitment not to manipulate information strictly hurts the public. Specically, there exists
B > Ca   12 , and E(B) < B   Ca + 12 for any B 2 (Ca   12 ; B), such that E(U q

) > E(UG)
if and only if B  E 2 (Ca   12 ; B) (E(B); B   Ca + 12 ].17
15Figure 1 also shows that the government will choose discipline whenever E exceeds a certain lower bound.
Intuitively, an increase in E makes discipline more attractive by increasing the impact of public opinion.
16The threshold value of B is identied by E(Uq

d ) = E(U
G
nd), where B only a¤ects the publics payo¤ via
q = RV
B Ca+1=2
Ca B   .
17Proposition 2 takes into account condition (3:2); q  qmax. See the appendix for more details.
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Finally, note that our analysis shows that bias can only moderate government policy if
electoral concerns are relatively weak. When E > B   Ca + 12 , the government is always
disciplined by public opinion, regardless of the level of bias. Electoral concerns then su¢ ce
to ensure that the government caters to the public. Thus, from the publics point of view,
manipulations simply stack the deck in favor of implementation, which decreases their payo¤.
The present model therefore suggests that the independence of government agencies should
unambiguously benet the public in mature democracies, where E is large. In contrast,
in less mature democracies, where governments care about public opinion but are not fully
responsive to electoral concerns, non independence may sometimes be socially optimal.
4. Secrecy
The previous section studied the case where the government must truthfully disclose both
the signal realizations and the level of bias. This section analyzes the polar opposite scenario
of secrecy: the government commits not to disclose either sq or q. The main complication
that arises is that, as in Canes et al. (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (2004), the government
now has private information. As a result, the publics choice will in general depend on the
policy decision of the government, which potentially conveys information.18
Despite this complication, we can characterize equilibrium play. Let R = 2 (1  ) and
V = 2 + (1  )2. Furthermore, let ^ = 2+R
1+R
2  1
2
; 1

be the publics belief that A is the
true state when q = 0, implementation is selected by the government, and the government is
disciplined by public opinion.
Proposition 3. The following is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the secrecy game. The
level of bias is zero. The government selects implementation when both signals are positive
and selects the status quo when both signals are negative. The public supports the status quo
whenever the status quo is selected.
i. If B  Ca   12 , then the government selects the status quo when the evidence is mixed
and the public supports implementation whenever implementation is selected.
18On the other hand, the publics choice v cannot depend on the realization of the signals sq or the bias q
because they are unobservable.
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ii. If B 2 (Ca   12 ; Ca   12 +E) and ^ < Ca, then the government selects implementation
with probability s = V
R
G+ Ca
2(Ca 1=2) when the evidence is mixed and the public supports
implementation with probability 1  1=2 (Ca B)
E
when implementation is selected.
iii. If B 2 (Ca   12 ; Ca   12 + E) and ^  Ca, then the government selects implemen-
tation when the evidence is mixed and the public supports implementation whenever
implementation is selected.
iv. If B  Ca   12 +E and ^ < Ca, then the government selects implementation when the
evidence is mixed and the public supports the status quo whenever implementation is
selected.
v. If B  Ca   12 +E and ^  Ca, then the government selects implementation when the
evidence is mixed and the public supports implementation whenever implementation is
selected.
The equilibrium in Proposition 3 exhibits several intuitive features. First, consistent
with conventional wisdom, secrecy is shown to be e¤ective at protecting the integrity of the
decision-making process. The government has no incentive to set a positive bias because
neither q nor the signal realizations are observed by the public. Increasing q simply reduces
the quality of information available to the government, so the equilibrium level of bias is zero.
A second intuitive feature of the equilibrium is that, as the governments private benets
B grows large, the government is less likely to be disciplined by public opinion. Proposition
3 shows that the government always selects implementation when the signals are positive,
and always selects the status quo when the signals are negative. Thus, for the government
to be disciplined by public opinion, we only need to check whether the government selects
the status quo when the signals are mixed. Proposition 3 shows that, when the signals are
mixed, implementation is always selected when B is large (cases (iv)-(v)), and it is often
selected when B is intermediate (cases (ii)-(iii)). It is only when B is small that the status
quo is always selected (case (i)). Thus, as B grows large, the government is less likely to
cater to public opinion.
It is also instructive to compare the equilibrium outcomes under transparency and secrecy
(Propositions 1 and 3). More cases must be distinguished under secrecy than under trans-
parency (ve versus three). Under secrecy, when the government selects implementation,
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the public cannot observe whether the signal are positive or mixed. The condition ^ < Ca
describes scenarios where mistaken implementation is su¢ ciently costly for the public to then
support the status quo. When mistaken implementation is less costly (^  Ca), the situation
is reversed. These complications do not arise under transparency because the public can
observe the signals, so that beliefs ^ play no role.
Note also that, because public opinion is inuenced by the governments policy decision,
a mixed strategy equilibrium can arise under secrecy. This does not happen under trans-
parency.19
Finally, from the publics point of view, the choice between transparency and secrecy
involves a key trade-o¤ between manipulations and discipline. Manipulations are always
(weakly) lower under secrecy, while discipline is always (weakly) higher under transparency.
That manipulations are lower under secrecy is obvious as q = 0. Let us therefore compare
transparency and secrecy in terms of discipline. When there is no conict of interest (case
(i)), the government is disciplined by public opinion under both scenarios. In contrast,
when the conict of interest is intermediate, the government is always disciplined by public
opinion under transparency (Proposition 1(ii)) but not under secrecy (Proposition 3(ii)-(iii)).
Furthermore, when the conict of interest is large, the government is sometimes disciplined by
public opinion under transparency (Proposition 1(iii)) but never under secrecy (Proposition
3(iv)-(v)). Thus discipline is always at least as likely under transparency as under secrecy.
This lack of discipline under secrecy is caused by a relative lack of accountability. Without
observing the report, citizens cannot determine exactly why a particular decision was taken.
For example, the governments decision to select implementation could be based on strong
19To see how mixed strategies can arise in case (ii), recall that whenB 2 (Ca  12 ; Ca  12+E), the government
would like to select implementation when the evidence is mixed (since B > Ca   12 ), but because E is large
relative to B (Ca  12 +E > B), it is unwilling to select an unpopular policy. Now, given that the report is not
disclosed, can the government get away with selecting implementation when the evidence is mixed? (When
the report is disclosed, the answer is no because the public supports the status quo if the evidence is mixed.
Thus discipline obtains. See Proposition 1(ii).) Suppose the government does select implementation when the
evidence is mixed. Then after observing implementation, the public must believe that the probability that the
true state is A is ^. If ^  Ca, this probability is high enough to induce the public to support implementation.
Thus the government gets away with selecting implementation and the equilibrium is in pure strategies (case
(iii)). However, if ^ < Ca, then the public does not support implementation. Because B < Ca   12 + E,
selecting implementation with probability one is not optimal for the government. Selecting the status quo
with probability one is also not optimal. Note in fact that if implementation is only selected when the signals
are positive, then the public must always support the government. This leads to a contradiction because if
the government policy is always supported, then the government follows its intrinsic preferences and selects
implementation with probability one when the evidence is mixed. Thus, when ^ < Ca, the only equilibrium
can be in mixed strategies (case (ii)).
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evidence (sG = (; )) or mixed evidence (sG = (;?)). The public would only like to
punish the government in the latter case but it cannot do so without seeing the report. As
a result, the government is less accountable and thus less responsive to public desires. It
is easy to construct examples where, because of this trade-o¤ between manipulations and
accountability, either transparency or secrecy is preferred by the public.
5. Independence and Optimal Constitutions
So far we have assumed that the government can easily interfere with the workings of the
agency in charge of collecting information. This is a reasonable assumption if, as in the U.S.,
the President appoints and can remove the heads of the executive agencies, thus exerting
enormous inuence over their policy decisions. Sometimes, however, executive inuence over
government agencies is more limited. Of special interest is the case of independent agencies
such as the Federal Trade Commission in the U.S. and the Bank of England in the U.K. These
agencies are not subject to the same degree of political control as other executive agencies
and are insulated from political pressure, for instance by limiting the removal of their heads
to certain causes.
This section considers the implications of granting full independence to the government
agencies in charge of collecting information. Formally, independence is modelled as a com-
mitment not to manipulate information. Thus, an independent agency will carry out its job
as objectively as possible. We rst compare transparency and secrecy under the assumption
that the agency is independent.
Proposition 4. Suppose the government agency is independent (i.e., q  0). Then the
publics payo¤ is always higher under transparency than under secrecy.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: if information cannot be manipulated,
then only accountability matters, and transparency is in the interests of the public.
Having established this benchmark result, we now consider the more interesting case
where both the disclosure rule (transparency or secrecy) and the degree of insulation of
the government agency (independence or nonindependence) can be chosen to maximize the
publics welfare. Following previous work, we refer to the stage when society decides the
rules of the game as the constitutionalstage. The four constitutions we consider are shown
in Table I.
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Table I: Constitutions
I
Transparency &
Independent Agency
II
Transparency &
Nonindependent Agency
III
Secrecy &
Independent Agency
IV
Secrecy &
Nonindependent Agency
A constitution is said to be optimal if it maximizes the publics welfare. Proposition 5
characterizes optimal constitutions.
Proposition 5. An optimal constitution always involves transparency. The comparison be-
tween Constitution I (transparency & independent agency) and Constitution II (transparency
& nonindependent agency) is ambiguous.
In an environment where information disclosure creates incentives for manipulation, it
is perhaps surprising that transparency is always optimal. The intuition for this result is
simple: the chief advantage of secrecy  unbiased information  can more e¤ectively be
achieved by insulating the government agency from political pressure. To see this more
formally, note that by Proposition 4, Constitution I (transparency & independent agency)
dominates Constitution III (secrecy & independent agency). Moreover, the two constitutions
involving secrecy (Constitutions III and IV) are payo¤ equivalent because under secrecy q is
always equal to zero in equilibrium. Thus transparency (Constitution I) always dominates
secrecy (Constitutions III and IV).20
However, this result does not imply that granting independence to government agencies
is necessarily in the public interest. Biased information can induce the government to be-
have more cautiously, thus mitigating the agency conict between the government and the
public (see Propositions 1 and 2). As a result, the comparison between Constitution I and
Constitution II is ambiguous.
6. Extensions
The analysis so far has focused on the polar opposite scenarios of transparency and secrecy.
Under transparency both the report and the bias in information are observable, while under
20This result requires the combination of transparency and independence to be available at the consti-
tutional stage. If independence was not feasible, the trade-o¤ between manipulations and accountability
highlighted in the previous section would obviously reappear.
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secrecy neither is observable. This section briey discusses two intermediate scenarios, dis-
closure of the report with unobservable bias and nondisclosure of the report with observable
bias, as well as a third scenario where disclosure is voluntary. More details about the results
in this section are available from the authors upon request.
Disclosure with Unobservable Bias. We begin with the case when the report is disclosed
but the public does not observe the bias of the agency. It can be shown that if assumption
(3.2) holds, then the equilibrium outcome when q is unobservable is exactly the same as
when q is observable. Thus, under assumption (3.2), Proposition 1 is not a¤ected by the
unobservability of q.
The idea behind this result is simple. When q is not observable, the public must form some
conjecture about the level of bias chosen by the government. In equilibrium, this conjecture
must be correct. Assumption (3.2) ensures that, when the public believes that q  qmax, then
the government will actually choose a level of bias q  qmax. Thus the publics belief can
be made consistent with the play of the game. In particular, the governments incentives to
set any q < qmax are just as in Section 3, so the same equilibrium as in Proposition 1 (with
observable q) can be supported.21
Nondisclosure with Observable Bias. An alternative scenario arises when the govern-
ment commits not to disclose the report but the agency bias is observable. This scenario is
plausible if the public is well-informed about the reputation and policy dispositions of the
individuals working for the agency, even though the report is not disclosed.
Compared to the case where bias is unobservable (secrecy), an interesting new e¤ect can
arise. Specically, the government may choose a strictly positive bias to commit itself to a
more congruent decision rule. Intuitively, by appointing a head of the agency who is well-
known to be biased in favor of implementation, the government can credibly commit not to
select implementation when the undisclosed signals are mixed. A mixed report from a very
biased bureaucrat provides very little evidence in support of implementation.
The optimal choice of q is therefore determined by two conicting e¤ects. On the one
hand, manipulations reduce the quality of information available to the government, which
reduces its payo¤. On the other hand, a su¢ ciently high level of bias allows the government
21If assumption (3.2) does not hold, then equilibrium behavior is more complicated and will generally
involve randomization over q.
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to commit to a decision rule that the public prefers. This can induce the public to support
the government policy more often, thereby increasing the government payo¤.
That being said, this new e¤ect of nondisclosure with observable bias is only present if the
government needs to convince the public to support its decision. Proposition 3 shows that
the public often supports the governments decision even if the agency is unbiased (q = 0)
(see cases (i), (iii) and (v)). In this sense, these elements of Proposition 3 will continue to
hold whether or not q is observable.
Voluntary Disclosure. We have assumed so far that the government must either disclose
the contents of the report or must keep it secret. More commonly, however, policymakers
have discretion as to whether to release information. We now consider a variant of the
model where the government cannot commit to any disclosure rule: disclosure is voluntary.
We argue that voluntary disclosure will e¤ectively result in all information being disclosed.
Indeed, since information is hard in this model, Milgroms (1981) unravelingresult applies.
To see the logic of this result, suppose the public expects the government to disclose
favorable information (the  signals). Thus nondisclosure is interpreted as evidence that
the information is unfavorable (a ? signal), which provides the government with a strong
incentive to disclose favorable information. Specically, a government that receives two
positive signals will disclose them and implement the policy with public support. When the
evidence is mixed or unfavorable, whether or not the signals are disclosed is inconsequential
because the public would realize that at least one of them is unfavorable. Thus they would
not support implementation. All information is therefore revealed, and the analysis would
proceed as in Section 3.
7. Conclusion
This paper develops a model where disclosure of information gives the government an incen-
tive to "x the evidence" around its ex ante favored policy. Decision-relevant information is
collected by an agency, but the government can distort this process, for instance by sta¢ ng
the agency with biased individuals. The key trade-o¤ the government faces is between pro-
tecting the quality of the information available for public decision making (if the agency is
unbiased) and molding public opinion (if the agency is biased). Surprisingly, we nd that
insulating the agency from political pressure, so that the agency is always unbiased, is not
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necessarily in the public interest. A biased information gathering process can in fact induce
the government to act more cautiously in response to information supporting its ex ante
preferred policy. This moderating e¤ect of bias can more than outweigh the welfare losses
caused by biased information.
We are not the rst to study whether government agencies should be insulated from
external or political pressures. Moe (1989, 1990) argues that government agencies are some-
times intentionally created to be unresponsive to political pressures to alleviate the risk of
political power uctuations. Prendergast (2003) points out that bureaucratstendency to
ine¢ ciently accede to customer demands may require appropriate organizational responses,
such as insulating government agencies from customer complaints. Betts (2004) notes that
a close connection between the President and top intelligence o¢ cials may be preferable to
the lack of such a connection because the risks of insulation and unresponsiveness often far
outweigh those of politicization. This paper highlights a novel drawback of bureaucratic in-
dependence: the risk that candid advice from government agencies may make policymakers
very responsive to information supporting their ex ante favored policy, thus exacerbating the
conict of interest between the government and the public.
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Appendix A: Payo¤s
This appendix derives explicit expressions for the government payo¤ and citizen welfare in
the transparency case.
The Government Payo¤. The government payo¤ is given by
E(q) =
P
sG2f;?g2
hP
sq2f;?g2 (p(s
q); v(sq)jsG) Pr(sqjsG)
i
Pr
 
sG

; (A1)
where (p(sq); v(sq)jsG) is the government expected payo¤ when the observed signals are sq
and the genuine signals are sG, and q is the probability that a genuine ? signal is transformed
into fake  signal.
To compute the probabilities in (A1), note that
Pr ((; )q) = Pr((; )q j (; )G) Pr((; )G) +
2 Pr((; )q j (;?)G) Pr((;?)G) + Pr((; )q j (?;?)G) Pr((?;?)G);
Pr ((;?)q) = Pr((;?)q j (;?)G) Pr((;?)G) + Pr((;?)q j (?;?)G) Pr((?;?)G);
Pr ((?;?)q) = Pr((?;?)q j (?;?)G) Pr((?;?)G):
Moreover
Pr((; )q j (; )G) = 1; Pr((; )q j (;?)G) = q; Pr((; )q j (?;?)G) = q2;
Pr((;?)q j (;?)G) = (1  q) , Pr((;?)q j (?;?)G) = q (1  q) ;
Pr((?;?)q j (?;?)G) = (1  q)2 ;
and
Pr((; )G) = Pr((?;?)G) =
1
2
 
2 + (1  )2 ;
Pr((;?)G) = Pr((?; )G) = (1  ):
Because in equilibrium Lemmas 1 and 2 must hold, we compute E(q) under the assumption
that (i) the public supports implementation if and only if both signals are positive, (ii) the
government selects implementation when both signals are positive, and (iii) the government
selects the status quo when both signals are negative. Thus, in equilibrium only two cases
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can emerge: either the government is disciplined by public opinion (thus it selects the status
quo when the evidence is mixed) or the government is not disciplined by public opinion (thus
it selects implementation when the evidence is mixed).
If the government is disciplined by public opinion, then (A1) is given by
E(qd) =
1
2
V (a; aj(; )G) + qR(a; aj(;?)G) + 1
2
q2V (a; aj(?;?)G) (A2)
+(1  q)R(n; nj(;?)G) + q(1  q)V (n; nj(?;?)G)
+
1
2
(1  q)2V (n; nj(?;?)G);
where
V  2 + (1  )2 = Pr((; )G) + Pr((?;?)G);
R  2(1  ) = 2 Pr((;?)G);
(the subscript d stands for discipline). It is simple to see, in fact, that Pr((; )q j (; )G) Pr((; )G) =
1
2
V , 2 Pr((; )q j (;?)G) Pr((;?)G) = qR, and so forth.
By contrast, if the government is not disciplined by public opinion, then (A1) is given by
E(qnd) =
1
2
V (a; aj(; )G) + qR(a; aj(;?)G) + 1
2
q2V (a; aj(?;?)G) (A3)
+(1  q)R(a; nj(;?)G) + q(1  q)V (a; nj(?;?)G)
+
1
2
(1  q)2V (n; nj(?;?)G);
(the subscript nd stands for no discipline). Equations (A2) and (A3) are of course identical
except when mixed signals are observed.
Computing the conditional payo¤s  is straightforward. For instance, (a; aj(; )G) =
 Ca
 
1  G+

+B =  Ca(1  2V ) +B, (a; nj(;?)G) =  Ca
 
1  G+B   E =  1
2
Ca +
B   E, (n; nj(?;?)G) =  Cn  =   (1 )2V Cn and so on. Plugging these values into (A2)
and (A3) yields
E(qd) =
1
2
V

 Ca

1  
2
V

+B

+ qR

 1
2
Ca +B

+
1
2
q2V

 Ca

1  (1  )
2
V

+B

+(1  q)R

 1
2
Cn

+ q(1  q)V

 (1  )
2
V
Cn

(A4)
+
1
2
(1  q)2V

 (1  )
2
V
Cn

;
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and
E(qnd) =
1
2
V

 Ca

1  
2
V

+B

+ qR

 1
2
Ca +B

+
1
2
q2V

 Ca

1  (1  )
2
V

+B

+(1  q)R

 1
2
Ca +B   E

+ q(1  q)V

 Ca

1  (1  )
2
V

+B   E

(A5)
+
1
2
(1  q)2V

 (1  )
2
V
Cn

.
To simplify the computations in Appendix B, it is helpful to normalize E(qd) and E(
q
nd) by
subtracting E(Gnd) from both. Since
E(Gnd) =
1
2
V

 Ca

1  
2
V

+B

+R

 1
2
Ca +B   E

+
1
2
V

 (1  )
2
V
Cn

; (A6)
(simply set q = 0 in (A5)), we obtain
qd;nd = qRE  
1
2
q2V [Ca  B    ] + (1  q)R

Ca  B + E   1
2

; (A7)
qnd;nd = qRE  
1
2
q2V [Ca  B    ]  (1  q) qV [Ca  B + E    ] ; (A8)
where   =
(1 )2
V
.
Citizen Welfare. Next, we derive the publics payo¤ (citizen welfare) in the transparency
case. Citizen welfare is given by
E(U q) =
P
sG2f;?g2
hP
sq2f;?g2 U(p(s
q); v(sq)jsG) Pr(sqjsG)
i
Pr
 
sG

; (A9)
where U(p(sq); v(sq)jsG) denotes the publics payo¤when the observed signals are sq and the
genuine signals are sG.
Because in equilibrium Lemmas 1 and 2 must hold, we also compute E(U q) under the
assumption that (i) the public supports implementation if and only if both signals are positive,
(ii) the government selects implementation when both signals are positive, and (iii) the
government selects the status quo when both signals are negative. Again, two cases can
arise.
If the government is disciplined by public opinion, then (A9) becomes
E(U qd ) =
1
2
V

 Ca

1  
2
V

+ qR

 1
2
Ca

+
1
2
q2V

 Ca

1  (1  )
2
V

(A10)
+(1  q)R

 1
2
Cn

+ q(1  q)V

 (1  )
2
V
Cn

+
1
2
(1  q)2V

 (1  )
2
V
Cn

;
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(as always, the subscript d stands for discipline).22
If the government is disciplined by public opinion, then (A9) becomes
E(U qnd) =
1
2
V

 Ca

1  
2
V

+ qR

 1
2
Ca

+
1
2
q2V

 Ca

1  (1  )
2
V

(A11)
+(1  q)R

 1
2
Ca

+ q(1  q)V

 Ca

1  (1  )
2
V

+
1
2
(1  q)2V

 (1  )
2
V
Cn

;
(the subscript nd stands for no discipline).
We also normalize (A10) and (A11) by subtracting E(UGnd) from both. This yields
U qnd;nd =   (1  q) qV (Ca    ) 
1
2
q2V (Ca    ) ; (A12)
U qd;nd = (1  q)R

Ca   1
2

  1
2
q2V (Ca    ) : (A13)
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove Lemma 1, it su¢ ces to show that setting any q > qmax is
dominated by setting q = 0. The government payo¤ when q = 0 is the maximum between
E(Gd ) and E(
G
nd). To derive the government payo¤ when some q > q
max is selected, we
use two facts. First, if q > qmax, then, by denition of qmax, the public never supports
implementation. Second, if sq = (?;?), then by Assumption 2 the government must choose
the status quo. Thus, when q > qmax, only three cases must be considered.
Case (i): the government selects implementation if and only if sq = f(; ) ; (;?) ; (?; )g
(no discipline). Let E(qnd;ns) denote the government payo¤ in this case (the subscript ns
is used to emphasize that when q > qmax the public never supports implementation). Note
that because the government selects the same policies as in the no discipline case, E(qnd;ns)
is equal to E(qnd), except that now the public does not support implementation when the
signals are both positive. Thus
E(qnd;ns) = E(
q
nd) 

1
2
V + qR +
1
2
q2V

E;
22The probabilities in (A9) have been computed above when deriving the government payo¤. The pay-
o¤s conditional on the true underlying signals are also easy to derive. For instance, U(a; aj(; )G) =
 Ca
 
1  G+

=  Ca(1   2V ), U(a; nj(;?)G) =  Ca
 
1  G =   12Ca, U(n; nj(?;?)G) =  Cn  =
  (1 )2V Cn, and so forth.
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since Pr((; )q) = 1
2
V + qR + 1
2
q2V . Simple algebra yields
E(qnd;ns) E(Gnd) =  
1
2
V E  1
2
q2V [Ca  B + E    ] (1  q) qV [Ca  B + E    ] < 0:
Thus, if case (i) applies, then setting any q > qmax is strictly dominated by setting q = 0.
Case (ii): the government selects implementation if and only if sq = (; ) (discipline).
Let E(qd;ns) denote the government payo¤ in this case. E(
q
d;ns) is equal to E(
q
d) except
that now the public does not support implementation when the signals are both positive.
Thus
E(qd;ns) = E(
q
d) 

1
2
V + qR +
1
2
q2V

E:
Simple algebra yields
E(qd;ns)  E(Gnd) =  
1
2
V E   1
2
q2V [Ca  B + E    ] + (1  q)R

Ca  B + E   1
2

;
and
E(qd;ns)  E(Gd ) =  
1
2
V E   1
2
q2V [Ca  B + E    ]  qR

Ca  B + E   1
2

:
Note thatCa B+E   > 0 by Assumption 2. Thus, regardless of the sign of

Ca  B + E   12

,
either E(Gnd) or E(
G
d ) (or both) are greater than E(
q
d;ns). Thus, setting q = 0 with the
appropriate policy rule (discipline or no discipline) dominates setting q > qmax when case (ii)
applies.
Case (iii): the government never selects implementation. This strategy obviously yields
a lower payo¤ than E(Gd ). In both cases, in fact, the government is always supported by the
public. In the latter case, however, the government selects implementation when the signals
are both positive. By Assumption 1, that yields a larger payo¤ than selecting the status quo.

To prove Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma B1. Suppose the government and the public share the same beliefs about the true
state: Gov = P . Then, whenever the public supports implementation, the government
also selects implementation. If the public supports the status quo, the government selects
implementation when Gov  Ca  B + E.
Proof of Lemma B1. Let Gov = P = . Recall that the public supports implementation
if   Ca. Assuming that the public supports implementation, the government selects
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implementation if   Ca   B   E. This condition is obviously implied by   Ca. Thus,
whenever the public supports implementation, the government also selects implementation.
The second part of the lemma follows immediately from equation (2.2). 
Proof of Lemma 2. From Assumption 1 and the fact that q  qmax, it follows immediately
that the public supports implementation if and only if both signals are positive. Because the
public supports implementation when both signals are positive, it also follows from Lemma
B1 that the government must select implementation in that case. Finally, Assumption 2
implies that the government selects the status quo when both signals are negative. 
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 2, we know that in equilibrium the government
selects implementation when both signals are positive and the status quo when both signals
are negative. Moreover, the public supports implementation if and only if both signals are
positive. The only thing that remains to be shown is whether implementation or the status
quo is selected by the government when the evidence is mixed.
Suppose that B < Ca   12 + E (cases (i) and (ii)). Recall that q = Pr(Aj(;?)q)  12 .
Because q  1
2
< Ca B +E, Lemma B1 implies that for all qs the government selects the
status quo when the evidence is mixed. Thus, if B < Ca   12 +E, for all qs the government
is disciplined by public opinion.
Next, we derive the optimal q when B < Ca   12 + E (cases (i) and (ii)). Recall that
E(qd) denotes the government payo¤ when the government is disciplined by public opinion
and the size of the bias is q. Dene
qd;nd  E(qd)  E(Gnd), where q 2 [0; qmax] :
The optimum q solves
max
q2[0;qmax]
E(qd);
or equivalently
max
q2[0;qmax]
qd;nd;
sinceE(Gnd) is independent of q. Thus the equilibrium level of bias is q
 = arg maxq2[0;qmax] E(
q
d).
In Appendix A we showed that
qd;nd = qRE  
1
2
q2V [Ca  B    ] + (1  q)R

Ca  B + E   1
2

;
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(see equation (A7)). By Assumption 2, Ca  B     > 0. Thus simple algebra yields
q =
(
R
V
1=2 Ca+B
Ca B   if B 2 (Ca   12 ; Ca   12 + E)
0 if B  Ca   12
:
Note that given condition (3.2), we restrict attention to parameter values for which the
constraint q  qmax does not bind. Using the above formula for q, we can rewrite condition
(3.2) more explicitly as
R
V
1=2  Ca +B
Ca  B    | {z }
q

 R
V
(Ca   1=2) +
q 
R
V
2
(Ca   1=2)2   (Ca    ) (Ca   G+)
(Ca   G+)| {z }
qmax
: (B1)
Dene B1 2 (Ca   12 ; Ca    ) as the value of B for which (B1) holds with equality, where
(B1) holds strictly for all B < B1. Hence there exist values of B 2 (Ca  12 ; Ca  12 +E) that
satisfy condition (3.2). (If instead B  Ca   12 , then q = 0 and assumption (3.2) always
holds.) This proves parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1.
To prove part (iii), let B  Ca   12 + E. Two cases can arise, depending on whether q is
above or below the threshold q^. q^ is dened as the minimum between 1 and the solution to
q = Ca  B + E. Recall that q =
R
2
+q(1 )2
R+qV
. Then
q^ =
R
 
1
2
  Ca +B   E

V (Ca  B + E)  (1  )2 =
R
V
1=2  Ca +B   E
Ca  B + E      1; (B2)
if Ca B+E  1 , and q^ = 1 if Ca B+E < 1  (the requirement that B  Ca  12 +E
implies q^  0).
Note that when q < q^, then it is optimal for the government to select implementation
when the signals are mixed, because q < q^ implies q > Ca   B + E (see Lemma B1).
Conversely, when q > q^, it is optimal for the government to selects the status quo. Thus,
when B  Ca   12 + E, the normalized government payo¤ is
qLB 

qnd;nd = E(
q
nd)  E(Gnd) if q 2 [0; q^]
qd;nd = E(
q
d)  E(Gnd) if q 2 (q^; qmax]
;
(note that q^  qmax is implied by (3.2) since q^  q). The optimum q solves
max
q2[0;qmax]
qLB:
It is easy to show that qLB has the following properties: (i) 
q
nd;nd is strictly convex in q,
(ii) qd;nd is strictly concave in q and achieves its maximum at q
 = R
V
1=2 (Ca B)
Ca B    q^, (iii)
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@qd;nd
@q
 0 at q^ < 1, and (iv) qLB is continuous on [0; qmax]. Indeed, simple computations
yield
@2qnd;nd
@q2
= V (Ca   B + E     + E) > 0 and @
2qd;nd
@q2
=  V (Ca   B    ) < 0.
Moreover
q  arg max
q2[0;1]
qd;nd =
R
V
1=2  Ca +B
Ca  B     . (B3)
Note that since q  q^ and qd;nd is strictly concave,
@qd;nd
@q

q=q^
 0. Finally, to show that
qLB is continuous on [0; q
max], note that qnd;nd and 
q
d;nd are both continuous in q on
their respective domains. Using (B2), it is also easy to verify that qnd;nd = 
q
d;nd at q^.
Proposition 1(iii) follows from these properties ofqLB. Note in fact that because
q
nd;nd
is strictly convex, then arg maxq2[0;q^] 
q
nd;nd is either 0 or q^. However, q^ yields a lower payo¤
than q since q^nd;nd = 
q^
d;nd  q

d;nd.
23 Thus, on [0; qmax], the optimal q is either 0 or q,
depending on whether E(0nd) 7 E(
q
d ) (or, equivalently, 
0
nd;nd 7 
q
d;nd). Finally, since
B1 > Ca  1=2, there exist values of B > Ca  1=2 +E that satisfy condition (3.2), provided
that E is su¢ ciently small. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose rst that B  Ca   12 . Then by Proposition 1(i),
the equilibrium level of bias is zero. Imposing q = 0 therefore leaves the publics payo¤
unchanged.
Suppose instead that B 2 (Ca  12 ; Ca  12 +E). Then by Proposition 1(ii), the government
is disciplined by public opinion and the equilibrium level of bias is q = R
V
1=2 Ca+B
Ca B   . If we
impose q = 0, (A7) implies the government will remain disciplined by public opinion since
Gd;nd = E(
G
d )  E(Gnd) = R

Ca  B + E   1
2

> 0:
Let E(U qd ) denote the publics payo¤under discipline and with bias q (see equation (A10)).
We have
U qd;d  E(U qd )  E(UGd ) =  qR

Ca   1
2

  1
2
q2V (Ca    ) ;
which is decreasing in q. Hence imposing q = 0 when B 2 (Ca   12 ; Ca   12 + E) will
strictly increase the publics payo¤.
Now suppose that B  Ca  12 +E. Proposition 1(iii) then implies that forq

d;nd  0, the
equilibrium level of bias is zero, so that imposing q = 0 has no e¤ect. If instead q

d;nd > 0,
then the government is disciplined by public opinion and the equilibrium level of bias is q.
23Actually, because B > 0 in case (iii), q^d;nd < 
q
d;nd.
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Moreover, by (A7), B  Ca   12 + E implies Gd;nd  0 . Hence imposing q = 0 leaves the
government undisciplined by public opinion. By (A13), this will strictly decrease the publics
payo¤ if
U q

d;nd = (1  q)R

Ca   1
2

  1
2
q2V (Ca    ) > 0:
Direct substitution yields UGd;nd > 0 and U
1
d;nd < 0, where U
q
d;nd is decreasing in q
.
Moreover, q = R
V
1=2 Ca+B
Ca B   is increasing in B, with q
 = 0 when evaluated at B = Ca  12 .
Dene B2 > Ca   12 as the value of B for which U q

d;nd = 0, where U
q
d;nd > 0 if and only if
B < B2. Moreover, dene B = min(B1; B2), where (B1) holds strictly if and only if B < B1.
It follows that, over the parameter region for which condition (3.2) does not bind, imposing
q = 0 will strictly decrease the publics payo¤ if and only if B 2 [Ca   12 + E;B) and
q

d;nd = q
RE   1
2
q2V [Ca  B    ] + (1  q)R

Ca  B + E   1
2

> 0.
Fix B > Ca   12 . Note that q = RV 1=2 Ca+BCa B   is independent of E, 
q
d;nd is strictly
increasing in E, and q

d;nd < 0 when evaluated at E = 0. Dene E(B) as the value of E
for which q

d;nd = 0:
E(B) =
1
2
q2V [Ca  B    ] + (1  q)R

B   Ca + 12

R
;
so that q

d;nd  0 for all E  E(B), and q

d;nd > 0 for all (E(B); B   Ca + 12 ] : To
complete the proof, it remains to show that E(B) < B Ca + 12 . This is the case since E(B)
is decreasing in q over the interval [0; R
V
1=2 Ca+B
Ca B   ], and E(B) = B  Ca + 12 when evaluated
at q = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Standard results in decision theory imply that, for any given
belief about q that the public may hold, setting q = 0 is a weakly dominant strategy for the
government (see Marschak and Radner, 1972, pp. 65-67. Further details are available from
the authors upon request).
To prove Proposition 3, therefore, we set q = 0 and check that the posited strategies form
an equilibrium. For brevitys sake, we focus on case (ii), which is the most interesting case
since it involves mixed strategies. Checking that the posited strategies form an equilibrium
for all the other cases is straightforward.
Let B 2 (Ca  12 ; Ca  12 +E) and ^ < Ca. Then the government always selects the status
quo when sG = (?;?). Indeed,
 Cn  >  Ca(1   ) +B   zE () Ca  B >     zE.
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It is also straightforward to check that the public always supports the status quo when p = n.
Note that, if the government always selects implementation when the evidence is mixed,
then the public must support the status quo when p = a since ^ < Ca. (Recall that ^ is
dened as the publics belief that A is the true state when q = 0, p = a, and a is selected
by the government if and only if sG 6= (?;?).) But this implies that it cannot be optimal
for the government to always implement the project when the evidence is mixed because, by
deviating and selecting the status quo, it would get an higher payo¤:
 Ca(1  1
2
) +B   E <  Cn1
2
() B < Ca   1
2
+ E:
Similarly, if the government always selects the status quo when the evidence is mixed, then
the public must always support implementation when p = a since G+ > Ca (by Assumption
1). But then it is not optimal for the government to always select the status quo since
B > Ca   12 . Thus the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
To characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium, we need to nd a probability z that
makes the government indi¤erent between selecting a and n when the evidence is mixed, and
a probability s that makes the public indi¤erent between supporting a and n when p = a.
The indi¤erence condition for the government is given by
 Cn1
2
=  Ca

1  1
2

+B   zE =) z = 1=2  (Ca  B)
E
:
The indi¤erence condition for the public is Pr(A j a; s) = Ca, where Pr(A j a; s) is the
publics belief that S = A when the government selects implementation (p = a), given that
the government implements the project with probability one if (; )G, with probability s if
the evidence is mixed, and with probability zero if (?;?)G. Using Bayesrule
Pr(A j a; s) = 
2 + sR
V + 2sR
= Ca =) s = 
2   CaV
R (2Ca   1) =
G+   Ca
2r (Ca   1=2) .
It is easy to show that ^ < Ca implies s < 1 and that B 2 (Ca  12 ; Ca  12 +E) implies z < 1.
Finally, note that if the government selects implementation with positive probability
when the signals are mixed, then it must select implementation with probability one when
the signals are both positive. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Obvious. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that Constitutions III and IV yield the same citizen welfare
since nondisclosure implies q = 0 in equilibrium (Proposition 3). Moreover, by Proposition 4
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Constitution I dominates Constitution III (and hence also Constitution IV). Thus disclosure
is always a feature of an optimal constitution. Finally, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate
that either Constitution I or II can be optimal. 
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